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Abstract
Pu, Linhai, B.A., Sichuan Union University, 1994.
Banking Sector Reform in China
The purpose of this research is to study the banking sector reform in China, its 
problems, its current situation, and its future direction. The banking system is at the 
heart o f reforms which China is attempting to initiate the future consolidation o f rapid 
economic growth initiated in the 1980s. The need for wide-ranging reform both o f the 
monetary policy and of the state banking system is due to the excesses o f the 1980s 
expansionary phase. As the channels of financing and o f credit allocation has become 
somewhat obsolete compared to reforms in the real sector o f the economy, the direction 
of the current banking sector reform become particularly crucial for China’s sustainable 
economic growth in the next century. This paper studies China’s banking sector both 
before and after its economic reform. Firstly, an institutional analysis approach is used 
to illustrate obstacles and breakthroughs in China’s banking sector reform. Then an 
econometric approach is used to study money demand models in China. The 
econometric study is primarily based on the Keynesian Theory and the Modern 
Quantity Theory. It also has some interesting findings beyond those from the 
institutional analysis.
From this research, three policy implications for reforms in China are given. These 
are: monetary discipline, proper growth rate of money supply, and market transparency. 
This paper proposes that in order to have a properly designed banking system, China
should incorporate both the western countries’ models and the uniqueness of the 
Chinese economy in its banking sector reform to facilitate sustainable economic 
growth.
Banking Sector Reform in China 
Section One: Introduction
In the late 1970s, China initiated a comprehensive and ambitious reform of its 
economic system. The reforms affected rural activities first, then spread to state-owned 
enterprises and brought about the development of a sizeable non-state sector.
Given the country’s size and history, China’s reform process thus far has been a 
unique experience. China’s reforms have been gradual, and the starting position was 
very different from that o f those Eastern Europe countries and countries of the former 
Soviet Union. China’s economic transformation resembles more the modernization of 
some East Asian economies than that of many former centrally planned economies.
Along with the decentralization and market-oriented reforms in other sectors of 
the economy, China’s banking system has also changed dramatically since 1979. 
Various specialized banks were created or reestablished and became the main channels 
of enterprise finance. Non-bank financial institutions began to operate and compete 
with state banks for savings and loans. Foreign banks have recently been allowed to 
operate in China, although their business scope is restricted. However, liberalization o f 
the banking system does not automatically ensure the stability o f the financial system, 
which is crucial to the stability of the overall economic development. The relaxation on 
banking control in China created serious macro-economic problems in 1992-1993 when 
many banks and their affiliated non-bank financial institutions poured a very large 
amount o f financial resources into imprudent activities, such as speculations in the real 
estate and the emerging stock markets. The increasing percentage o f non-performing
loans in bank’s total outstanding loans and the increasing share household deposits in 
bank’s total liabilities also posed serious pressures for the banks to consider the quality 
o f their assets and the liquidity risks involved. A system of prudential and protective 
regulations to ensure the soundness of the banking system is therefore urgently 
necessitated.
This paper seeks to discuss the developments in China’s banking sector and 
the associated problems that need to be considered and solved. The second section 
briefly describes the banking system in China before the 1979 reform. The third section 
extensively discusses several aspects of the banking reforms in China during its 
economic reform. The fourth section utilizes an econometric approach to estimate a 
money demand model for China and to give empirical evidences o f the impact of the 
many changes resulting from the banking sector reforms. In the fifth section, policy 
implications o f the study and recommendations for the future direction of China’s 
banking sector reform are discussed.
Section Two: China’s Banking System before Its Economic Reform.
The Chinese banking system before economic reform comprised the essential 
components of the “monobank” model inherited from the Soviet version o f Marxist- 
Leninist socialism. The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the dominant domestic 
banking institution, basically serving as a “monobank” that handled most financial 
transactions. It was formed in 1948 and expanded its organization rapidly. By 1952 all 
banks were effectively under the supervision of the PBC. By 1957 it reportedly had 
20,000 branches and sub-branches and controlled over 100,000 rural credit 
cooperatives (Miyashita, T., p. 117). Two other specialized banks, the People’s
Construction Bank o f China (PCBC) and the Bank of China (BOC), operated as special 
departments within PBC. The PBC has assumed the major banking role in post-1949 
China, being responsible for the issue and control o f currency, management of 
government accounts and the administration and supervision of short-term loans for 
working capital. All enterprises, government units and cooperatives had to keep their 
accounts with it and settle accounts between them through its agency; individuals also 
kept saving deposits there (Donnithome, A., p.405-6,).
Under the socialist planned economy model, the PBC and its specialized 
departments, acted mainly as cashiers, with their functions confined to the settlement o f 
enterprises’ transactions, the administration of funds for working capital and short term 
investment-for the part not already covered by budgetary grants-and the collection o f 
household savings. Thus, their intermediation function was limited. Bank lending 
covered only transitory and unexpected financial requirements above the assigned 
quota. Bank loans were generally short term, mostly granted to finance the 
accumulation of stocks or the purchase of raw materials-in effect, substitutes for 
buyers’ credits and commercial bills. Interest was charged in an attempt to encourage 
enterprise to use funds more effectively. Lending rate, however, were low compared 
with both interest rates on savings deposit and administrative costs, and priority sectors 
continued to benefit from preferential rates.
The PBC was organized vertically in parallel w ith the state administrative 
structure, with each bank office responsible to the level immediately above it. Each 
bank operated under a unique “dual leadership”, that is, control by the head office in
Beijing and from the provincial party committees (Byrd, W., p. 10). Figure 2.1 gives the 
organizational structure of the PBC.
During the socialist movement in China, the PBC was responsible for overseeing 
the distribution of credit to each enterprise and for ensuring the latter’s operations were 
efficiently and in conformity with planned target. However, as a banking system under 
direct government management and control, a defining character of the centrally 
planned economy, the PBC had little authority over its operation. Loans were granted 
upon request, but repayment was not strictly enforced. More ever, the banking system 
often became captive to local and provincial government keen to promote production in 
their jurisdictions. As Byrd reports:
From 1958 until 1979, local party or revolutionary committees were in charge 
o f  appointment, dismissal, transfer, and promotion o f bank personnel in places under 
their jurisdiction. This meant that political criteria often dominated the choice o f  bank 
cadres, specialized training and even elementary financial accounting were neglected, 
and bank employees making special loan decisions were easily influenced by personal 
connections with those who had appointed them. Local party committees would often 
make direct requests fo r specific loan projects, which could not be refused. (Byrd,
p. 12).
Figure 2.1 The Organization of the People’s Bank of China
before Reform
State Council 
(The Central Government)
The People’s Bank of China, Main Office 
(Beijing)
Municipal Branches 
(municipalities directly under 
the central government such 
as Shanghai and Tianjing)
Provincial Branches 
(provincial capitals)
Field Branches Field Branches 
(cities)
Central Field Branches 
( centrally located counties)
Field Branches 
(counties)
Offices Offices Business Offices
Suboffices Suboffices Credit cooperatives
Supplementary Units Supplementary Units
of Savings of Savings
Urban Area Rural Area
Source: Hsiao, K.H.Y. Huang, 1971, Money and Monetary Policy in Communist China, 
New York: Columbia university Press. P. 22.
This institutional feature, one of the major defining characteristics o f the central 
planned economy, further weakened the ability of the banks to exercise discrimination 
in the apportionment of loans and exert disciplinary pressures on poorly performing 
enterprises. It is not very surprising when Byrd coined the phrase, “ treasuries for local 
governments”, to describe banks in China during the pre-reform period. However, 
knowledge of the banking system before the reform is very crucial to understanding the 
consequent banking reform in China. Besides others, perhaps the most significant 
continuity between the pre- and post-reform financial systems is the fact that, with the 
removal of the many constraints of central planning, the pressures from local 
governments and other agents on the banking system have been a powerful feature of 
the reform period and remain an enduring problem for the central financial authorities 
and reform policy-makers.
From this brief discussion of the banking system in China before its reform, we 
can better understand the relevant background in which China began to conduct its 
banking sector reform. The discussion presented in this section highlights the difficulty 
of the task of moving from a centralized financial system within the planning 
mechanism to a system in which financial resources are raised and allocated according 
to more market-oriented forces and in which financial institutions are required to play a 
active and discretionary role.
Section Three: Banking Sector Reform from 1978 to Present.
3.1: The Structure o f the New Banking System
In 1978, the People’s Bank of China (PBC) was formally separated from the 
Ministry of Finance and was granted a ministerial rank. In January 1984, the PBC
became the central bank, and its commercial banking business was taken over by the 
newly established Industrial and Commercial Bank o f China (ICBC) as well as other 
specialized banks. The purpose of this move was to separate the administrative 
functions of the banking system from its commercial functions.
By the end of 1991, PBC had its headquarters in Beijing, 44 first level branches in 
all province and large cities, more than 400 second tier branches at the regional level 
(between province and country), and about 2000 branches at the country level. As the 
central bank, PBC is a government administrative organization directly led by the state 
council. Its main responsibilities are to make macro monetary policies, control the 
money supply, interest rates, and exchange rates, serve as the treasury o f the central 
government; regulate financial markets; and formulate the overall credit and loan plan. 
PBC is also the official representative for China in international monetary 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (since 1980) and Asian 
Development Bank (since 1985). In addition, the State Administration o f Exchange 
Control (SAEC) is affiliated with the PBC. SAEC is a government agency that controls 
and regulates foreign exchange.
Under the central bank, the banking system consists o f specialized banks and 
commercial banks. There are four government-owned specialized banks in China: the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for urban areas, the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC) for rural areas, the People’s Construction Bank o f China (PCBC) 
for long-term investments on a large scale, and the Bank o f China (BOC) for foreign 
exchange. Rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) are collectively owned rural financial 
institutions and they are affiliated with the ABC. Closely associated with the PCBC is
the China Investment Bank (CIB), the main function of which is to channel loans from 
international sources (mainly from the World Bank). Besides the four specialized 
banks, there are several more comprehensive commercial banks have been established 
during the reform period. Among them, the Bank of Communications (BOCOM), and 
CITIC Industrial Bank (CITICIB) have a national network o f branches; others are 
regional banks, such as Shengzhen Merchant Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, Guangdong 
Development Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, etc.
3.2: Present Characteristics of China’s Banking Sector
After approximately 20 years of China’s economic reform, the four state-owned 
specialized banks still dominate the financial sector. Despite the significant progress 
made in the developing a banking system and the contribution made by China’s 
banking system to the financial deepening of the country, banks in China and, in 
particular, the four state-owned specialized banks, can not be characterized as modem, 
efficient banking institutions. This situation is mainly due to the uneven path of past 
reforms, the government’s views regarding the role of banks in the reform process, and 
political and administrative considerations. There are at least four characteristics or 
impediments that banking sector reformers in China need to address.
First, the four state-owned specialized banks never experienced an arm’s-length 
relationship with the government, a situation that has had several repercussions. For 
most o f the time since their establishment, this close relationship has meant that the 
specialized banks had to follow conflicting mandates. Banks have been increasingly 
been stimulated to become profit oriented, while at the same time they had to operate 
under government instmctions, mostly in the form of policy lending. One of the main
consequences of the dominance of policy lending activities is the low quality o f their 
loan portfolios. Faced with the pressure of policy lending, the state-owned specialized 
banks failed to adopt modem management techniques such as asset/liability 
management, loan risk assessment, and loan monitoring. Banking system reform is 
closely related to state-owned enterprises reform. “Sustained monetary equilibrium 
requires not only an efficient mix o f macro-economic policies geared toward price 
stability but also a sound and competitive financial sector whose behavior can be 
influenced by interest rates signals.’’(Jefferson, Rawski, and Yuxin Zheng, p. 240). 
There is growing evidence that uncompetitive banking systems and inadequate 
regulatory frameworks weaken the efficiency of credit allocation, distort the structure 
of interest rates, and disrupt the transmission of monetary policy signals, with adverse 
consequences for macro-economic stabilization.
Second, the high degree of decentralization of the branch structure is another 
impediment to adopting modem bank management techniques. The status o f the bank 
branches in China has always been an interesting issue. Branches in China enjoy such a 
high level of autonomy that they do not fit the definition of a branch as understood in 
industrialized countries. At the origin of the branches’ unique position is the way in 
which the People’s Bank o f China and the four state-owned specialized banks were 
formed. At the separation their functions in the early 1980s, the People’s Bank o f China 
received the “lion’s share of the total ‘headquarters’ instmction, leaving each of the 
four specialized banks the task of building a headquarters unit. This job has proven to 
be difficult because the branches were well established and well rooted in the local 
political structures.”(Wu, Lanjun, pp. 7-9). In addition, the early reform years were
marked by a mood of economic decentralization that made the establishment of strong 
headquarters tantamount to going against the reform tide. It is now difficult to bring the 
branches under the headquarters’ direction and control, and, as a consequence, it is not 
an easy task to introduce principles such as liquidity management and asset/liability 
management in super-sized banks with between 28,000 (People’s Construction Bank of 
China) and 56,000 ( The Agricultural Bank of China) branches.
Third, during most o f the period since 1978, bank supervision and prudential 
control have remained geared toward ensuring compliance with economic regulation, in 
particular, the fulfillment o f the credit plan. Criteria and regulations that prevail in a 
market-oriented environment, such as bank soundness and safety and, ultimately, 
stability of the financial system, have not yet been integrated into the supervisory and 
regulatory framework by the authorities. This is in part reflects the lack o f a broad legal 
operating framework for banks during most of the reform period. At a more specific 
level, proper loan classification and adequate provisioning for bad loans have not yet 
been applied. Eliminating this regulatory and supervisory gap looms as one of the big 
challenges in the commercialization process of the four major state-run banks. A lack 
of market-oriented supervision has also led to a situation ’’wherein the four state-owned 
specialized banks de facto have become universal banks, with all the risks that this 
entails in an inadequately regulated environment." (Wu, Lanjun, pp. 7-9).
Fourth, closely related to the above problems, the issue o f interest rate 
liberalization also calls concerns regarding its impact on the regions in China. Before 
1980, the fundamental characteristics of china’s regional policy can be summarized as 
having a centralized and unified relationship between the central and provincial
governments, as well as a strong politically-related regional development strategy. “The 
economic management system operates under a ‘vertical setup’, using state ministries 
and commissions, as well as national banks and their local branches as the main body to 
control various economic activities o f the localities. As for the regional layout and 
invest distribution, strategies are notably related to national defense considerations 
rather than criteria of regional comparative advantage and economic efficiency.” 
(Ma.).
In a market-oriented financial system, the allocation o f funds has a more 
anonymous character than in a planned economy. As the market sectors grow, the 
influence of the authorities on the sectoral and geographical allocation of resources 
through monetary policy will diminish, compared with a system in which a credit plan 
dominates. At present, the incomplete integration of the markets in China allows the 
central bank to intervene in one part of the country without spreading the effects o f its 
intervention across the country. The de facto financial integration that will take place 
under further financial reform will inevitably bring into the effect o f divergence. 
Divergence could take place because funds will tend to flow to regions with higher 
return rates or because local borrowers in lagging regions do not meet the eligibility 
standard o f the banks. Divergence trends will increase the present gap between rich and 
poor regions in the country and lead to more social and political tensions.
3.3: Two Important Aspects of the New Commercial Bank Law
Following the March 1995 passage o f the central banking law, the people’s 
Congress enacted the law o f the people’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks on 
may 11, 1995. The law, which aims to transform major domestic commercial banks
into independent commercial entities, marks a further step in building a strong, 
comprehensive, and relatively independent banking system.
The commercial bank law establishes a two-tier commercial banking system 
comprising (1) commercial banks, subject to prudential ratios and other international 
standards of portfolio risk and profitability, and under the supervision of the PBC, and 
(2) the three policy lending banks, which are not subject to this law but whose 
operations are guided by individual charters. As set out in Article 2, the law applies to 
commercial banks, that is, corporate persons established for handling such operations as 
accepting deposits from the public, providing loans, and handling settlements. Article 
13 clarifies that this definition includes urban and rural cooperative banks, for which 
the minimum required capital is low. The law also applies to foreign-owned 
commercial banks, and subsidiaries o f foreign commercial banks. As explained in 
Article 4, a central feature of the new law is that commercial banks shall operate 
independently, bear risks on their own, and take responsibility for their own profits and 
losses. Also, no organization or individual will be allowed to interfere with commercial 
bank operations.
The separation of banking and non-banking activities is critical in China’s 
banking reform. According to the provisions o f Article 43, commercial banks are no 
longer allowed to invest in nonbanking financial institutions such as trust and 
investment corporations or security companies or in non-financial enterprises. In an 
effort to make banks concentrate on lending to enterprises, the law establishes a “China 
wall” between commercial banking operations and other operations that are deemed to 
be more volatile and speculative.
These provisions are reinforced by Article 46, which prohibits the use o f inter­
bank lending to extend fixed-asset loans. Inter-bank lending should be confined to 
cover settlement deficiencies and to bridge temporary liquidity shortages. These 
dispositions, although they may be difficult to enforce, aim at limiting investment in 
fixed assets, which contributed to the country’ high inflation rate in recent years.
The separation of policy lending from commercial lending has also become a 
critical issue in China’s financial reform. The leading idea behind the establishment in 
1994 o f three policy lending banks is to channel the flow of new policy lending through 
these newly created institutions. This is a significant step in the commercialization o f 
the state-owned banks. In addition, the clear separation of commercial lending from 
policy lending will facilitate the implementation o f indirect monetary policy, that is, 
liquidity management at the level o f the system, rather than liquidity management at the 
level o f individual banks or liquidity management simple to meet credit plan targets, or 
both. (Fry; Maxwell J.).
However, the provisions of the Article 41 of the Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks (1995), which stipulate that “commercial banks wholly 
owned by the state shall provide loans for projects approved by the state council.” seem 
to indicate that policy lending might not be confined to the policy lending banks. In 
addition, the specialized banks are still burdened by stock o f non-performing loans 
generated by past policy lending. Because policy loans are meant to support the priority 
sectors identified in the government’s economic policies, they are mandatory. 
Therefore, the projects to be financed with these loans might not meet commercial 
banks’ criteria for lending.
With respect to the policy lending banks, the State Development Bank will be 
responsible for financing key construction and infrastructure projects and strategic 
industries. Its coverage is quite broad as it could finance (1) highways, ports, power and 
railway; (2) basic industries, such as steel and the chemical industries, and raw 
materials; (3) emerging industries, such as the automobile and electronics industries; 
and (4) other priority state projects in other sectors, including forestry and agriculture. 
The Import-Export Credit bank has a narrower scope; it will provide buyers and sellers 
credits in support of import and export activities. The Agricultural Development Bank 
of China will become a purely policy-based lending institution, whose activities will 
include financing the state’s procurement of agricultural products and agricultural 
development. (Giradin, Eric, p. 104)
The new commercial bank law is an important step toward designing a 
framework within which the financial sector can and should develop. The law 
delineates the activities of both the banking system and non-banking financial sector. 
Overlapping activities-and the accompanying existence of a gray are between banks 
and non-banking financial institutions- have long been a weakness of China’s financial 
system. Consistent with law on the People’s Bank of China, this law obliges 
commercial banks to comply with the PBC’s supervision and prudential control, 
thereby enforcing the central bank’s position as regulator of the financial system. 
Equally important are the provisions of Article 22 that make each commercial bank, as 
a legal entity, responsible for the liabilities of all its branches. This provision is 
intended to make a clear break with past practice, which permitted branches to act like 
independent units.
3.4: The Position of the People’s Bank of China
Ten years after the establishment o f the People’s Bank o f China as the Central 
bank in 1984, the People’s Congress enacted a law giving the central bank the power to 
perform central bank functions. At the time that the Chinese authorities were 
reassessing the legal framework for the central bank, the case for giving central bank a 
high degree of authorities was being made convincingly worldwide. The Chinese 
authorities were facing the dilemma of having to give up certain aspects o f the 
traditional political structure to allow the central bank more autonomy versus retaining 
the present decision-making structure which is centralized in the State Council and 
based on consensus building. The critical question is therefore, how independent should 
it be from the State Council to perform its functions? It is evident that although lessons 
could be drawn from recent developments in central bank legislation elsewhere, it 
would be difficult to copy the concept o f an autonomous central bank o f the western 
countries in China’s case at this time.
A conventional prescription for the position of the central bank has been to make 
the central bank “independent”, thereby insulating it from the “political “ process and 
the influence of vested interests. Those supporting the case for an independent central 
bank in China argue that this would not only be a recentralization o f power (and 
thereby reduce the influence of local governments enterprises) but would also be a 
policy initiative capable of reducing the influence of the central government over the 
banking system. This is deemed desirable on both specific and general grounds, namely 
that (1) central government expenditures have been important in generating inflationary 
pressures; and/or (20 the central government’s developmental objectives are
inconsistent with price stability. (Cargill, T.) The case for central bank independence 
has also been applied specifically to the Chinese case (notably Allsopp and Lin). They 
argue that the central bank should have only one objective: price stability. If it has 
multiple objectives, it is argued, such as price stability and developmental objectives, 
then central banks are faced with difficult choices and often err on the side of 
development at the cost of price stability. If the central bank has a responsibility only 
for price stability, then it can be relieved of these dilemmas and a constituency will 
have been created which has as its “raison detre” price stability. (Allsopp, C., and Lin,
c.)
From the point of view of China as a late developer with multiple 
macroeconomic priorities, the task o f the central authorities in reforming the role the 
role of the central bank should be seen as the need to find a balance between two 
imperatives: the need to strengthen the power of the central bank, particularly over the 
specialized banks, in order to counter the influence exerted on them by local 
governments, branch departments and enterprises, and at the same time the need to 
retain sufficient political control over the central bank to ensure a financial system 
capable of implementing key developmental objectives such as regional/sectoral 
redistribution, rapid growth and employment creation. It is therefore more realistic to 
view the issue of the central bank’s role in terms of discretionary autonomy within, 
rather than independence of, the central government. Actually, this idea is reflected in 
the combination of the provisions o f Articles 2 and 7 of the People’s bank of China law. 
Article 2 establishes an agency under the leadership of the State Council, which 
entrusts this agency with a high level of independence from all other levels of
government. Article 7 stipulates that in the exercise of its functions the PBC shall be “ 
free from intervention by local governments, or other administrative organizations at all 
levels, public organizations or individuals.” (People’s Bank of China Annual Report) 
Section Four: Money Demand Models in China.
4.1 Introduction:
The money demand function plays an important role in the transmission 
mechanism of both monetary and fiscal policies. The prominent importance o f the 
money demand mechanism is attributed to its possible temporal predictability which is 
crucial for monetary and fiscal policies to have a predictable effect on output, price 
level, and other economic variables. This section estimates the demand for money in 
China using annual data from the period from 1978 to 1992. The objective is to find 
money demand models that would be capable of reflecting the profound institutional 
changes in the money and banking sector during the economic reform.
In a developing country like China, which is experiencing the great transition 
from a central planned economy toward a market-oriented economy, the necessity to 
study the money demand function is especially eminent. The Chinese government has 
traditionally depended heavily upon stable governmental monetary and fiscal policies 
to adjust the macro economic variables, studies in this area is imperative.
Though there are many theories in the West concerning the demand for money 
function, two theories are worth studying in China’s case: one is the Keynesian theory 
and the other is the modem quantity theory chiefly based on the monetarist theory. The 
relevance o f Keynesian theory is that Keynesian theory is historically favored by 
policy-makers in developing countries because o f its explicit support for government
intervention in the economy. The modem quantity theory is worth noting due to the fact 
that it is currently the most popular approach employed by the economists in this field. 
Therefore, this paper will utilize models based on these two theories to analyze the 
demand for money in China.
4.2: A Review of the Demand for Money in the Keynesian Theory.
In his analysis o f the demand for money in the General Theory of Employment. 
Interest and Money (1936). Keynes distinguished three main motives for holding 
money, namely, the transaction motive, precautionary motive and speculative motive. 
The transaction demand is simply the demand for money that is necessary to carry out 
normal currency transaction. Keynes divided his transaction motive into an income and 
a business motive since these transactions are carried out by both individuals and 
business. The income motive is the transactions motive applied to private persons, 
which largely depend on the size of incomes and the length of time between the receipts 
of income and its being spent out. The business motive refers to the desire to hold cash 
in order to bridge the interval between the incurring of costs and the receipt o f the 
proceeds from sales. The strength o f this motive depends on “the value of current 
output (and hence on current income) and on the numbers of hands through which 
output passes”(Keynes, pp. 195-6).
Keynes’ analysis of the speculative motive is o f significant innovation compared 
to his contemporary economists. He showed that the demand for money was interest - 
elastic and that at some low rate o f interest it might become perfectly elastic because of 
the existence of a gap between what individual speculators regard as the normal level of 
the rate interest and the actual current level. As the future a rate of interest is uncertain,
people have the opportunity to speculative in the hope o f “ securing profit from 
knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth” (Keynes, p i 70). Since 
Keynes limited people’s options other than holding money to one alternative: holding 
bonds, so what people think will happen to the rate of interest determines whether they 
will store in bonds or money.
In general, Keynes denoted the amount of money for the transactions and 
precautionary motives by the symbol M l, the amount held for the speculative motive 
by M2. Corresponding to this division there are two liquidity functions LI and L2. LI 
depends mainly on the level o f income, L2 mainly on the rate o f interest and 
expectations. Thus:
M = M l + M2 = L 1 (Y) + L2( i ) (1.1)
Y : level o f income 
i : rate of interest and expectation 
Keynes’ analysis o f the demand for money is clearly divided into two parts, one 
part regarding money as a means o f payment, the other as an asset. According to this 
view, individuals are seen to hold money for transaction purposes and some for its use 
as a store o f wealth.
4.3: A Review of the Demand for Money in the Modem Quantity Theory.
The modem quantity theory has its theoretical basis in the work o f Milton 
Friedman. In his analysis, Friedman did not explicitly answer the question as what the 
motive for people to hold money are. Instead, he focused on what factors determine 
how much money people want to hold given that money yields utility. Friedman 
distinguished two types of money holders. Firstly, there are the ultimate wealth-
holders, who demand money as one way in which to hold their wealth. Secondly, there 
are business enterprises who demand money as a productive resource, just like plant 
and machinery or any other asset that contributes towards production
In his analysis of the demand for money by ultimate wealth-holders, Friedman 
discussed the utility function and the budget constraint in very general terms. He noted 
that there will be diminishing marginal utility from money and a whole host o f other 
financial assets and real assets may provide alternatives to holding money. As money is 
regard as an asset in the wealth portfolio, the total wealth of the individual becomes the 
constraint on his demand for money. The wealth in this sense is a stock, a collection of 
assets providing income and consumable services. The income and consumable 
services are, on the other hand, “a flow emanating from ownership of the assets.” (D.G. 
Pierece, p67). Income is the yield on wealth and wealth is the present value of the 
discounted flow of income. If Y is the total flow of income, W is the stock of wealth 
and i the rate of interest, then: W = Y / i. In this approach, income is regarded as an 
alternative to wealth to influence the demand for money. According to Friedman, this is 
probably the main difference between his own theory and earlier theories on the 
quantity analysis o f demand for money
As regard to budget constraint, the maximum amount an individual can convert 
into money includes his net financial wealth and his physical wealth such as the stock 
o f housing and consumer goods. Wealth should include human wealth as well as social 
conventions. The existence o f uncertainty limits the extent to which the individual may 
exchange future labor income for increased money holdings. He asserted that the 
demand for money should depend upon total wealth (the non-human wealth plus the
human wealth). But because the illiquidity o f human wealth he also included the ratio 
o f human wealth to non-human wealth denoted by h as a determinant o f the demand for 
money. The higher the ratio of illiquid human wealth to non-human wealth for a given 
level o f total wealth, the higher we might expect the demand for money to be.
The second group of factors affecting the demand for money is the returns to be 
gained from holding money and from holding other assets. Friedman distinguishes five 
assets that constitute the wealth portfolios: money, bonds, equities, physical non-human 
goods and human capital. Money in certain forms may provide monetary returns to its 
holder, also, it provides convenience and security. The real return per nominal unit o f 
money is a function of the general price level. The price level, which we denote by P, 
affects the real return on all forms o f wealth. A bond entitles its holder to a regular 
money income for a specified period of time, so the real return from holding bonds,
which we denoted by lb, will affect the demand for money. Similarly, the return from
equities, which we denoted by le, will have impact on the demand for money. Physical
goods are similar to equities except that the return they provide to their owners is in 
kind rather than in money. The nominal value of this return depends on what is 
happening to prices. In addition, physical goods provide a nominal return in the form of 
any appreciation /depreciation in normal value. This is given by the expression 
(l/P)(dP/dt).
The final group of factors affecting the demand for money may be called tastes 
and preference, which we denoted by u. So Friedman gave his demand for money 
function as:
Md = f  (ib, ie, l/p*dP/dt, h, Y, u ) (1.2)
lb: total return from holding bonds
le: return from holding equities
l/p*dP /d t: nominal return from physical goods 
h : the ratio of human to non-human wealth 
Y : money income 
u : the preference .
The function is assumed to be homogenous of degree one in prices and money 
income, for the “ demand equation must be considered independent in any essential 
way of the nominal units used to measure money variables” (Friedman, p. 10). Thus if
prices and money income change by x per cent, all other independent variables
constant, then the demand for money balance will change by x per cent. So the function
1.2 may be written as:
Md / P = f  ( r, Yp, h, Tie) (1.3)
where f  (Yp) >0, f  (h) > 0 and f  (Tie) < 0 
r: a vector of interest rates
Yp: a measure of total wealth or permanent income 
h: the ratio of human to non-human wealth
Tie : the expected rate of inflation
This function 1.3 will be the equation we employ in using the modem quantity 
theory to analyze the demand for money function in China.
4.4: Design the Econometric Models for the Demand for Money in China.
From the above analysis, it is seems easy to design the econometric models 
according to the theoretical functions. However, the demand for money with “ Chinese 
characteristics” causes dilemma for such attempt. During its economics development, 
China has encountered several natural disasters and some man-made disasters such as 
the Cultural Revolution and the Great-Leap Movement. These political upheavals 
disrupted the normal economic development. The inherent defects o f the central 
planned economy also hindered its economic growth. The mechanism of money 
demand like many other things in China is apparently different from those in the 
Western countries. Therefore, the inflexible and rigid application o f these Western 
theories to study China’s demand for money is fundamentally invalid. We must 
constantly “accommodate” a series o f “Chinese characteristics” in our studies.
In a developing country like China, there is an extra demand for money besides 
the factors regularly considered in the western theory. It is the monetization process in 
which the proportion of the economic activity conducted using money as the medium of 
exchange increases. As an economy develops, not only does the total output increase, 
so does the proportion of the economy that is monetized. Contrary to that in developed 
countries, this monetization effect is obvious in many developing countries. Therefore, 
in explaining the demand for money in China, the monetization effect should also be 
included. However, there is no direct measurement o f the monetization process. Since 
money is most commonly used in cities and towns where the economic transactions are 
mostly conducted via various forms o f money and much less frequently used in rural 
areas where the economy is characterized by self-sufficiency small land farmers. 
Furthermore, the difference between the urban areas and rural areas in China is still
shockingly big albeit the tendency o f narrowing this difference. It is reasonable to use 
the urban and township population as the percentage of the total population to 
approximate this monetization process in china.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the Chinese economy has undergone drastic 
changes in the recent two decades. The great economic reform initialed in 1979 by Mr. 
Deng Xiaoping has significantly changed the whole Chinese economic system from a 
central planned economy to a semi-market oriented economy. So the econometric 
model should reflect this great transformation in the Chinese economy. We will use 
dummy variable to test whether the economic reform since 1979 has had changed the 
demand for money function in China in our following analysis.
An econometric model of money demand in China based on Keynesian theory 
should be:
M t=  pi + p2*Yt + p3*INTt + p4*Mt-l + P5*UP + 81 *D + S2*D*Yt 
+ S3*D*INTt + S4*D*Mt-l + 85*D*UP (2.1)
Yt = GDP in year t 
INTt = interest rate in year t 
(Mt-1 = Money demanded in previous year)
D = 1 from 1979 to 1992 , otherwise D = 0 
UP= percentage of city and township population 
As an alternative to the linear-linear form, the log-log form will also be used in 
the econometric analysis as:
InMt = p i + p2*lnYt + p3*lnINTt+ p4*lnMt-l + p5*lnUP + 81*D +
82 * D * In Y t+S3 * D * lnINTt+54 * D * InMt-1 +85 * D * InUP (2.2)
The econometric model for money demand in China based on the Friedman 
theory should be:
ln(Mt) = p i + P2*ln(Yt’) + p3*ln(7Tt) + p4*ln(UPt) + p5*ln(INTt)+ 61 *D 
+62*D*ln(Yf) + 63*0*10(711) + 64D*ln(UPt) + 65*D*ln(INTt) (2.3)
Y’: per capita permanent income 
71: expected rate of inflation
UP: percentage o f urban and township population 
(Note: other variables are defined the same as in the Keynesian model in equation 2.1.) 
4.5: Explanations to the relevant data collected and adjusted.
In this money demand analysis, one basic assumption is that the quantity o f 
money demanded is in equilibrium with the amount of money supplied and 
consequently, the amount of money demanded equals the amount of money supplied in 
a certain year. So we use the money supplied each year to represent the money 
demanded each year in this analysis. There are two definitions of money supplied used 
in this analysis: M l and M2. M l is defined as the sum of currency in circulation and 
demand deposits of firms and institutions. The M2 is defined as the M l plus the total 
amount of household savings.
The relevant data we need in this econometric analysis are listed in the equations 
in the previous part. However, not all precise data sources are available. Due to some 
historical reasons, a systematic economic and statistical data recording system had been 
disrupted several times until the late seventies in China. Also, the historical 
unpopularity of western economic system and western ideology in this country
rendered some statistical methods not compatible to those in western countries for a 
long time. For example, before 1975, there is no data on national income in China 
because there was only negligible amount of service sector in the Chinese economy 
before its economic reform and the service sector had not been counted until 1975. So 
we have to replace the national income data before 1975 with the GDP data.
As to the interest rate, there are no systematically consistent data on the 
generally referred interest rate indexes such as the thirty-day treasury bond interest rate 
or other indexes based on the free market supply demand relations in China for a long 
time. A strong caution should be made about the analytical ability of the available data 
on interest rate of various bank deposits as precise indicators of market demand supply 
relations because they had been seriously distorted under the central planned economy 
system. Even today, the commercial banks in China are still under tight administrative 
control by the People’s Bank of China, the central bank of China. The various saving 
rates are still decided by the People’s Bank of China with more consideration on macro- 
economic adjustment than on the market demand supply relations. However, as for a 
long time before the reform, the investment facilities for general public in China were 
restricted to bank deposits. For example, the first stock exchange market in P. R. 
China’s history — Shanghai Stock Exchange was established only in 1986. Though the 
scale o f the stock market in China has grown dramatically. As a percentage to the total 
economy, it is still very low. So the explanation power of those data of interest rate in 
China will be justified to some extent. Therefore, is this analysis, we use the weighted 
average of interest rates on various bank deposits including passbook saving, 3 month 
time deposit, 6 month time deposit and one year time deposit as the approximate
reflection o f the market interest rate in China.
Also, as the official inflation rate is unavailable before 1979, it is reasonable to 
use the free market price index of consumer goods as the approximate reflection o f the 
inflation rate. In some years, the computed inflation rate maybe be negative, as the 
expected rate of inflation nt in the Friedman model is expressed as the actual rate of 
inflation in the previous year and people generally assume the inflation rate to be equal 
or above zero, so we artificially make the inflation rate in any year to be equal or above 
zero.
The permanent income referred in the Friedman theory is expressed by the per 
capital income divided by the interest rate since the permanent income is the present 
income discounted by the interest rate. As to the units of the data, the M l, M2, GDP 
and NI(national income) are in billions of Renminbi Yuan. The INT(interest rate) , 
INF(inflation rate) and UP(urban and township population in the whole population) 
are in percentage. The POP(total population ) are in the unit of ten thousand.
4.6:The econometric analysis, explanations and some conclusions.
Based on the general Keynesian model as the equation 2.1 
Mt = p i + p 2 * Y t +  p3*INTt + p4*M t-l + P5*UP + S1*D 
+S2*D*Yt + 63*D*INTt + S4*D*Mt-l + S5*D*UP 
We test the data from 1952 to 1978 and 1979 to 1992 separately. Then we will 
use dummy variable D to test the whole data. As the D=0 from the 1952 to 1978, so the 
separate test for the period before China’s economic reform is using the equation as:
Mt = p i + p 2 * Y t +  p3*INTt + p4*M t-l + P5*UP 
The SAS result is:
Mt = 20.09 + 0.04Yt - 1.36INTt+ 0.77Mt-l - 0.38UP (6.1)
(seb) 15.41 0.02 0.66 0.09 0.66
(Pvalue) 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.0001 0.57
From the above result, P2 is positive which shows a positive relation between the 
money demand and the gross domestic product. p3 is negative which shows a negative 
relation between the demand for money and the interest rate. We can see that the 
Keynesian model’s prediction about the signs of the parameters is precisely confirmed 
by the China’s money demand data from 1952 to 1978. The P5 with its P-value at .57 
is also in accordance with the fact that before the great economic reform, there was no 
significant urbanization process and with the rigid central planned economy, there was 
no significant monetization process and consequently no significant monetization to 
affect the demand for money. However, the apparent high P-value for p2, p3 also 
reveals that this model has the problem of multicollinearity because Mt-1 is obviously 
also a function of Yt-1 and INTt-1. Since Yt and Yt-1 and INTt and INTt-1 are highly 
correlated to each other, there is near exact linear dependency among the explanatory 
variables Mt-1, Yt and INTt as shown in the high Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
between Mt-1 and Yt as 0.94168 and that between Mt-1 and INTt as -0.85955 , both 
overwhelmingly above 0.8 and signaling a serious problem of multicollinearity. The 
similar log-log form based on the above equation also has confirmed this assertion. 
Therefore, in the consequent analysis, we discard Mt-1 as one explanatory variable to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity.
The new Keynesian model based on the above modification is:
Mt = pi + p2*Yt + P3*INTt+ P4*UP
The SAS result based on this model is a lot more satisfactory. The result is :
Mt = 51.62+ 0.21*Yt - 4.31*INTt - 0.81*UP (6.2)
(seb) 31.51 0.02 1.19 1.39
(pvalue) 0.11 0.0001 0.0017 0.56
The log-log form generates the similar results:
InMt = 0.94 + 0.301nYt -0.971nINTt + 0.981nUP (6.3)
(Pvalue) 0.68 0.12 0.0005 0.05
However, here we have some problem with the unreasonably high P-value of 
InYt, which means there is a 12 percent chance (12 may be zero and the InYt may be 
statistically insignificant in explaining the InMt. Therefore, we try the modified form as 
equation :
In Mt = p i + P2*lnYt + p3*INTt + p4*lnUP 
with a more satisfactory result:
InMl = 0.49 + 0.521nYt - 0.15INTt + 0.49*lnUP (6.4)
(seb) 2.09 0.52 0.033 0.53
(pvalue) 0.82 0.0007 0.0002 0.37
This form in equation 4.4 is apparently the desired form since the result making 
most sense. It effectively eliminates the problem of unreasonably high P-value o f InYt 
in equation 4.3, which suggests InYt has a twelve percent chance o f being zero and 
therefore is statistically insignificant. This is obviously contrary to the Keynesian 
theory. But in our modified model, the P-value of InYt is only 0.0007 and can make the 
InYt fit into the Keynesian theory. Furthermore, the modified model has increased the 
explanation power of the model with the adjusted R square value of 0.9509 in model
4.4 compared to the adjusted R square value of 0.9479 in model 4.3. Consequently, we 
will use this modified form in our subsequent analysis.
A regression analysis on M2 in China before its reform based on Keynesian 
model is:
lnM2 = -0.56 + 0.611nYt - 0.12INTt + 0.71 *lnUP (6.6)
(seb) 1.91 0.11 0.03 0.49
(pvalue) 0.77 0.0001 0.0005 0.1615
From the above result, the GDP and the interest rate is highly statistically 
significant and economically makes sense to explain the demand for money in China 
before its reform based on the Keynesian theory. Specifically, a one percent increase in 
China’s GDP corresponded to a 0.52 percent increase in China’s demand for M l and a 
0.61 percent increase for its demand for M2 during the period form 1952 to 1978 when 
other variables were held constant. Also, a one percent increase in interest rate 
corresponded to a |e**(-0.15) - 1| percent, or 13.93%, decrease in demand for M l in 
China and a ]e**(-0.12) - 1| percent, or 11.31%, decrease in demand for M2 in China 
during the same period when other variables were held constant. We tend to conclude 
that the money demand function based on the Keynesian theory is a respectable model 
for modeling the demand for money in China before its economic reform period.
The econometric model based on the modem quantity theory to analyze the 
demand for money in China before its economic reform with the reasonable 
modification based on the above selecting process is:
ln(Mt) = p i + p2*ln(Yt’) + p3*7it + p4*ln(UPt) + p5*INTt 
The SAS results are:
ln(M l) = 6.60 + 0.711n(Yt’) + O.OOlrrt + 0.891n(UPt) - 0.012INTt (6.7) 
(pvalue) 0.0001 0.0003 0.0070 0.1241 0.8309
Adjusted R-square: 0.9551 F-value: 128.489
ln(M2) = 6.73 + 0.811n(Yt’) + O.OOlrrt + 1.121n(UPt) +0.019IN Tt (6.8) 
(pvalue) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0076 0.0488 0.7285
Adjusted R-square: 0.9589 F value: 140.95
From the above SAS results, we can conclude based on the modem quantity 
theory that before China’s economic reform, a one percent general increase in the per 
capita permanent income in China resulted in a 0.71 percent increase in the demand for 
M l and a 0.81 percent increase in the demand for M2 in China when other variables 
were held constant. Also, a one percent increase in people’s expected inflation rate 
resulted in a 16**0.001 -11, or 0.1%, decrease in the demand for M l and M2 in China 
when other variables were held constant. These two inferences are in conformity with 
the conditions stipulated in equation 1.3. The high P values of ln(UPt) in both equations 
shows that monetization process is not a significant factor in deciding the demand for 
money in that period. This is in conformity with the result from the Keynesian theory. 
The unreasonably high P values of the coefficients of interest rate in both equations 
(0.83 and 0.72) may be caused by the limited explanation power of the data on interest 
rate or rather the drawback in the design of the model. For example, to include both 
the expected rate of inflation and the interest rate into the model, we may once again 
encounter the problem of multicollinearity.
The analysis of the demand for money in China after its economic reform is 
conducted with similar methods as in the period before its reform. The SAS results are
listed briefly as the following:
In the Keynesian model:
InMl = -1.41 + 1.151nYt - 0.019INTt - 0.1481n(UPt) (6.9)
(pvalue) 0.5176 0.0004 0.0562 0.8884
Adjusted R-square: 0.9888 F value : 295.866 
lnM2 = -1.07 + 1.571nYt - O.OlINTt - 1.021n(UPt) (6.10)
(pvalue) 0.6331 0.0001 0.2226 0.3673
Adjusted R-square: 0.9926 F value : 445.504 
So the analysis based on the Keynesian theory shows a one percent increase in 
the GDP resulted in a 1.57 percent increase in the demand for M l in China and a 1.57 
percent increase in the demand for M2 in China in its reform period from 1989 to 
1992, when other variables were held constant. Also, a one percent increase in interest 
rate corresponded to a |e**(-0.019) - 1| percent, or 1.88%, decrease in the demand for 
money in M l and a |e**(-0.01) - 1| percent, or 0.995%, decrease in demand for money 
in M2 in China during the period from 1979 to 1992 when other variables were held 
constant.
In the modem quantity theory model:
InM l = 8.66 + 1.1 llnYt’ - 1.05 Tit + 1.181n(UPt) + 0.15INTt (6.11) 
(pvalue) 0.52 0.12 0.07 0.69 0.09
Adjusted R-square: 0.9618 F value: 63.971
lnM2 = 11.7 + 1.461nYt’ - 1.35 Tit + l.OOln(UPt) + 0.21INTt (6.12) (pvalue) 
0.52 0.13 0.08 0.80 0.08
Adjusted R-square: 0.9570 F value:56.641
From the large p values, we can see the analysis based on the modem quantity 
theory fails to provide meaningful insights into the demand for money in China after its 
reform. However, we can not conclude that the modem quantity theory is not 
applicable to China. Especially when we consider some o f our assumptions and 
limitations, it might not be the case that the modem quantity theory per se is at fault. It 
might be the case that our inaccurate data and the assumption that the money demanded 
and supplied is in equilibrium are accountable for the unsatisfactory results derived 
from the regression models based on the modem quantity theory. Actually, only after 
China’s economic reform began in 1979 did the conflict between the insatiable demand 
for money and the limited supply for money become so severe. Most likely, the data we 
used for M l and M2 to represent the demand for money is especially inaccurate after 
China’s economic reform. Therefore, we can only conclude that in this particular 
project, despite the theoretical superiority o f the modem quantity theory, the Keynesian 
theory on the demand for money seems to be a better model in analyze the demand for 
money in China after its economic reform.
Finally, we combine the data from 1952 to 1992 together and set a dummy 
variable D as D= 1 if observations are from 1979 to 1992, and set D to zero if 
observations are from 1952 to 1978. We also use Chow Test by setting the intercept 
dummy variable coefficient and the parameters dummy variable coefficients all equal 
to zero. The SAS results are:
In the Keynesian model:
InM l = 0.94 + 0.51*lnYt -0.14INTt + 0.34*lnUP - 5.27*D +
(pvalue) 0.61 0.0001 0.0001 0.48 0.06
0.41*D*lnYt + 0.12*D*INTt + 0.89*D*lnUP (6.13)
0.14 0.0005 0.4742
An F test for the null hypothesis that the coefficient of D and all the parameters 
and dummy variable interactive coefficients equal zero, the F value is 4.2657, P value 
for this F test is 0.0075. This F test shows that the null hypothesis is not supported by 
the data. Then we support the alternative hypothesis that at least one dummy variable 
coefficient is not zero. Therefore, the economic reform did influence the money 
demand mechanism as we have predicted.
In the model based on the modem quantity theory: 
ln(M l) = 7.77 + 0.60*ln(Yf) + 0.10*7it + 0.37*ln(UPt) - 0.06*(INTt) -7.71*D 
(p value) 0.0001 0.0012 0.1008 0.5253 0.2425 0.2635
+ 0.06*D*ln(Yf) - 1.20*D*7it+ 2.72*D*ln(UPt) + 0.17*D*INTt (6.14) 
0.8714 0.0594 0.0826 0.0246
Albeit the several high p values for the intercept coefficient of the dummy 
variable, the slope coefficients of the dummy variable, and the parameter interactive 
variables, the F test with the null hypothesis that the coefficient of D, all the 
parameters, and the dummy variable interactive coefficients are zero resulted in a F 
value o f 4.0273. The P value for the F test is 0.0070. This F test shows that the null- 
hypothesis is not supported by the data and we tend to support the alternative 
hypothesis that at least one dummy variable coefficient is not zero.
These results have confirmed our preceding separate analysis that the money 
supply mechanisms are different before and after China’s economic reform. Both the 
theoretical analysis and statistical evidence indicate that the demand for money in
China has changed siginificantly during the economic reform period. Also, the money 
demand function based on the Keynesian theory seems to be a better function to 
modeling the money demand mechanism in China through the year 1952 to 1992. 
Though the modern quantity theory may be theoretically better, however, it is not a 
very relevant theory to modeling the money demand mechanism in China in that 
period. Furthermore, the above statement should lead to no conclusions beyond the 
suitability o f the two theories in China’s case. When we consider China’s special 
characteristics, our assumptions and the limitation of the data, and further 
generalization is deem unwarranted.
As we point out in the above analysis, only after China’s economic reform 
began in 1979 did the conflict between the excessive demand for money and the limited 
supply for money become so severe. Most likely, the data we used for M l and M2 to 
represent the demand for money is especially inaccurate after China’s economic reform 
and this basic assumption does not hold true in the period form 1979 to 1992. From our 
above analysis, we can only conclude that the money demand mechanism has changed 
in China after its economic reform. We are also inclined to conclude that one percent 
increase in China’s GDP will result in a higher percent increase in the demand for 
money, and a one percent increase in interest rate may result in a lower percent 
decrease in the demand for money during the economic reform period than the period 
before the reform. The results in the equation 6.13 have confirmed this prediction. 
However, due to data imperfections in our project, any definite quantitative conclusions 
based on our present project are immature and unwarranted at present stage.
Section five: Conclusions.
The analyses o f the above sections have clear policy implications. First, they 
suggest the importance of monetary discipline. Low inflation and consistent monetary 
policy are clearly preferable since inflationary expectations are very important in 
determining the money demand, and a high inflationary expectation would cause 
instabilities in the economy. Maintaining a low level of inflation is particular difficult 
when the government has a huge deficit. However, discipline in the money supply 
requires a more developed financial market - especially the financial market - and a 
relatively independent central bank. Experience from industrial and newly 
industrialized countries suggest that most of the administrative controls prevailing in 
China should eventually be eliminated. However, financial market decontrol itself will 
lead to chaos if  financial regulations are not properly installed at the same time. A 
system o f prudential and restrictions and protective regulations to ensure the soundness 
of the banking system is therefore urgently necessitated.
Second, the growth rate of the money supply should accommodate both GNP 
growth and the monetization process. In the past, the introduction of the responsibility 
system in the rural area and the change of the investment scheme from the fiscal 
allocation to bank loans caused extraordinary demand for money. The current reform in 
the housing sector and increasing the stock and bond markets will certainly have 
monetization consequences. The central bank needs to anticipate the demand for money 
changes caused by a reform and change it monetary policy accordingly.
Third, market transparency is essential in China's further financial reform 
process. For example, the control over interest rates should be gradually relaxed so that 
interest rate can be used in the money demand equation to reflect the true opportunity
cost o f holding money in the future. Without market equilibrium interest rates, it is 
impossible for the financial market to function properly.
Amid the recent financial crisis sweeping much o f the Southeast Asian 
countries, China’s situation has remained relatively calm. Dai Xianglong, the governor 
o f the People’s Bank o f China, who has been dubbed “ China’s Alan Greenspan”, is 
overseeing an ambitious plan to remake China’s central bank in the image o f the United 
States Federal Reserve. The aim is to consolidate the authority of the central bank and 
strengthen its independence from local authorities. Determined to push ahead with 
banking reforms in China, Dai recently promised to overhaul the country’s financial 
system while threatening to close down unqualified financial institutions. Apparently, 
the banking systems of western nations, particularly the United States, are the direction 
and ultimate goal for China’s banking reform.
The future o f China’s banking reform possesses a great challenge to the policy­
makers as well as to the economists concerned. This paper tries to emphasize the 
uniqueness of the country’s cultural, economic, and financial situations. China’s current 
banking system along with its flaws inherited from the pre-reform system will 
inevitably hinder china’s further economic development. Rigid adoption o f the western 
countries’ models as panacea to the existing problems in China’s banking sector also 
will do more harm than good to the Chinese economy. The main idea o f this paper is 
that properly designed banking sector reform can be an important contributing factor in 
the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy. A flexible and pragmatic approach to 
incorporate both the western countries’ models and the uniqueness o f the Chinese 
economy is essential to facilitate further economic growth in China.
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